Iḍṭirārī Knowledge (Involuntary Knowledge) in the early Islamic Thought Until the fifth century (A.h). (with emphasis on the doctrines of Imamyya and in comparison with those of the Mu’tazilah and Ahl Al-Hadith)

Author:
Ali Amirkhani
Level:
Ph.D
Subject(s):
Islamic religions
Language:
Farsi
Faculty:
Faculty of Islamic Denominations
Year:
2016
Publisher:
URD Press
Supervisor(s):
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani
Advisor(s):
Reza Berenjkar, Mostafa Soltani

The idea of involuntary knowledge (Al-ma’rifat Al- Iḍṭirāryya / المعرفة الاضطراریة) has root in the Islamic sources (Quranic verses and traditions of the holy Prophet); thus, the early Imamiyyah and Ahl al-hadith thinkers who had a special attention to Islamic texts, believed that the knowledge is Iḍṭirārī. Their Criterion to identify this kind of knowledge was its involuntariness. Therefore Iḍṭirārī knowledge is a knowledge that its realization is outside of the domain of human’s voluntary action but it is God’s work and creature. The first Imamiyyah thinkers considered the outcome of the knowledge Iḍṭirārī (involuntary) and hence not a matter of duty. Therefore they believed that the first duty is not knowing God, but is faith in God and acknowledging this faith. They also accepted the implications of their opinion and acknowledged there is no reward or punishment with regard to the realization of this knowledge. Ahl al-hadith, although maintained that the knowledge is Iḍṭirārī, due to some of their theological basis, believed that it is a matter of religious duty and its realization or un-realization will receive reward or punishment.  The criterion which early Mu’tazili Mashaikh (such as Abu Hudhail) adopted for the Iḍṭirārī knowledge differs from the criterion Imamiyya scholars and Ahl al-Hadith used. They believed that the Iḍṭirārī Knowledge is that one which “does not need to argumentation and reasoning”, and therefore they believed that knowing God is not a matter of duty and it is acquired without any effort or by a little reflection. For the first time, Nazzam and his followers said that knowing God requires argumentation and reasoning, and accordingly its acquirement is obligatory. Bishr ibn Muʿtamir kept the Imamiyyah criterion in the issue of knowledge, though standing on the Muʿtazili basis not only said that the knowledge is not Iḍṭirārī but claimed that all knowledges – even sensational knowledges – are voluntary. After him, the Aṣḥāb al-Maʿārif from the Muʿtazili School, using the same criterion of Bishr, opposed him and claimed that all knowledges are Iḍṭirārī. Because their idea was not in complete compatibility with other basis of Iʿtizāl (such as the self-sufficiency of reason and freedom of the will), the majority of Muʿtazilites, both from the School of Basra and the School of Baghdad, rejected it. After the time of the presence of Imams (a) and in the theological school of Baghdad, since the Imamyyah scholars considered Iḍṭirārī knowledge through the lens of prevalent Muʿtazili thought and since they fell apart from the theological heritage of early Imamiyyah, the idea of Iḍṭirārī knowledge lost its advocates so that at the time of Shaykh Mufīd and then Sayyid Murtaḍā and Shaykh Ṭūsī this idea was denied seriously and only the idea of acquirable knowledge معرفت اکتسابی)) was accepted and approved.