“Explanation of Alston and Bergmann’s Presentation of Skeptical Theism and Consideration of its Objections”
- Author:
- Sayyed Ahmad Reza Hashemi
- Level:
- Master
- Field of study:
- Philosophy of Religion
- Language:
- Farsi
- Faculty:
- Faculty of Philosophy
- Year:
- 2018
- Publisher:
- URD Press
- Supervisor(s):
- aeimeh PourMohammadi Mahounaki
Recent versions of argument from evil claim that we see instants of gratuitous suffering around us; and this fact constitutes an appropriate empirical evidence against Theism. Skeptical Theism is an atitude to respond to these arguments. It apeal to human cognitive limitation to discern God’s reasons for permitting such evils. On this view, if there is a God, his/her knowledge is far better and wider than our; and it is quite likely that he/she has reasons for his/her actions that they are unfamillier with us. Thus if we can’t see any God-justifying reason for some instants of permitting evils, it wouldn’t be considered as an evidence against existance of God. Although that view provides a significant respond to evidential argument from evil, but it contains some horrific consequences for other our belives including some belives concerning Theism and morality. There are different presentations of Skeptical Theism; and william Alston’s and Michael Bergmann’s presentations is one of the best. This thesis is in charge of explanation and consideration of this presentation. Apealing to possible unknown entailments Alston claims that theodicies are still live possible probabilities for responding to evidential arguments from evil; but later he tries to base his critique on our incompelete grasp of possible God’s reasons. Following and developing these notes, Bergmann emphasises that we have no good reason for thinking that our sample of goods, evils and entailments between them is a representative one. Although their view seems reasonable At first glance, but when we consider its consequences, we would be skeptical in accepting it. This view overwhelms our current understanding of God’s Attributes and actions; damages our trust in our moral intuitions; and have a serious conflict with moral commonsensism.