A Comparative Review of Ontology of Moral Truths in Martyr Mutahhari and Ayatollah Jawadi Amoli’s View

In the field of ontology of moral truths, some thinkers and scholars have skewed towards a view which is unrealistic and holds that moral injunctions are created and derived, by negating the existence of moral truths or their independence existence. They believe that moral injunctions and propositions merely imply speaker’s feelings and affections, that moral truths have no independent existence, and that they are not allegedly considered as a part of external world. Another group of western thinkers, based on their skeptic view, state that the righteousness of moral injunctions and propositions is contingent upon the objectivity and independent existence of moral values and truths, and that such objectivity is denied because it is “strange” and “relative, so these injunctions are untrue. According to realistic approach in ethics, however, moral values of affairs which are independent from men’s minds have external existence and men try to discover these values. The present thesis seeks to reanalyze the ontology of moral truths, using the foundations proposed by such Muslim thinkers as Ayatollah Jawadi Amoli, the great commentator of Transcendent Theosophy, and Martyr thinker Mutahhari. It is also clear that Muslim thinkers consider moral truths as realities which are discussed using certain abstract concepts which are kinds of philosophical secondary intelligibles, and believe that their existence in the world can be explained like the existence of realities which can be explained using abstract concepts. Therefore, moral truths are real and external concepts not as essential concepts which have objective and independent instances; rather, they are a kind of philosophical concepts with external origin of abstraction and their accidence is allegedly mental and their qualification is external. The present paper concludes that these two great thinkers are among realist philosophers.