Skeptical Theism from Wykstra’s and Perrine’s Piont of View; Translation and Analysis

The problem of evil is one of the important issues in the philosophy of religion. There are two versions of the problem of evil: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. Different answers have been given to these two versions. One of the answers given to the evidential problem of evil is based on the limits of human cognitive powers. This idea, known as skeptical theism, relied on two types of principle in response to the evidential problem of evil. The first is principle of the limits of human cognitive powers. The second is principle of CORNEA. Two of philosophers of skeptical theism are Stephen J. Wykstra and Timothy Perrine. In their latest joint article, they have presented a new version of skeptical theism. Beforehand, Wykstra provided a version of skeptical theism against William Row’s evidential argument; but this version is ineffective against new evidential argument from evil such as Paul Draper’s argument. Thus, in “Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning” (2014), Wykstra and Perrine have presented a new version of skeptical theism against Draper’s argument. Justin McBrayer believes that CORNEA, as Robert Nozick’s condition on epistemology, is dependent on the condition of sensitivity; and counterexamples show that CORNEA lacks the condition of sensitivity. In “Foundations of Skeptical Theism CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities” (2013), Wykstra and Perrine have modified McBrayer’s counterexample then have rejected it by conditional probabilities and Bayes’ theorem.   In this thesis, the two articles are translated from English into Persian and analyzed and explained in the introduction.